A subjetividade situada dos Ensaios de Montaigne

Abstract

This article aims to investigate a fundamental aspect of the notion of subjectivity that emerges from Michel de Montaigne's Essays. Montaigne speaks of himself and the world around him from the first-person perspective, and it is from himself that he gives meaning to what happens to him. However, this first-person "I" is not a pure form, nor a formal a priori condition of anyone's experience. This "I" from which—and from whose standpoint—he speaks, the consciousness of this subjectivity emanating from his own investigation, is neither transcendental nor can it be reduced to such a category. Throughout the Essays, Montaigne takes care to remind us that the subjectivity he seeks to narrate and bring to light is situated, so that his "self" may be comprehensible, both in its own constitution and in relation to his judgments about things. What, then, is the meaning of this subjectivity that only allows itself to be understood in its situated and circumstantial aspect? It is on the meaning of this situated subjectivity that the present study focuses.